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The ambiguous attractiveness of mobility: A view 
from the sociology of critique* 
Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen 
abstract 
This article examines the forms of mobility that characterize contemporary work life. In 
doing so, it applies the theoretical framework associated with Luc Boltanski’s sociology of 
critique (Boltanski, 2012 [1990]; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]) and argues that 
this framework offers a fruitful and important perspective in conceptualizing and 
understanding the forms of mobility that are becoming increasingly prevalent in today’s 
knowledge work. The sociology of critique allows one to chart the economic and historical 
conditions of mobility critically, while its sociology of morals also allows us to explore the 
distinctly normative side of new forms of mobility without succumbing to a celebratory 
picture of work-related mobility. More specifically and in the context of the ‘kinetic elite’, 
the article explores how Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) analysis of a ‘projective order of 
worth’ can help us understand the attractiveness of constantly being ‘on the move’. 
Qualitative data from three exemplars of this elite group of workers is used to illustrate 
how the ideal of being mobile is perceived as an often problematic imperative, but also as 
one which is nevertheless rewarding and worth living up to. 
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Introduction 
In the Old Testament, two conflicting pictures of God’s relation to movement are 
presented: According to the first, the realm of God can be expanded by building 
temples that define the geographical and spiritual boundary of Judaism towards 
an immobile point, namely God’s permanent position. According to the second 
picture, however, the center of Judaism is not immobile; rather, God is taken to 
dwell directly in the Ark of Covenant. Each time the Jews move position, they 
move the Ark of Covenant and thereby the very presence of God. In the Exodus 
from Egypt, other slaves are left behind, but no territory is lost or gained; rather, 
the center of Judaism and divinity as such is moved. This is essentially what 
Deleuze (1977: 149) meant by paradoxically stating that nomads do not move: 
nomads seem to continually displace the center according to which their 
movement could be defined.  
This change in conception adopted in The Book of Exodus seems like a perfect 
fable for the conception of mobility in today’s tribe of urban nomads employed in 
creative or knowledge-intensive industries. As Bauman’s (1998, 2007) studies 
suggest, novel forms of mobility create both an elite (including e.g. the versatile 
consultant, banker or designer working on geographically dispersed projects) as 
well as a new class of poor (i.e., low-level workers servicing the mobile or 
immigrant workers forced into mobility). On a global scale, the new elite of 
successful urban nomads may thus be surrounded by immobile ‘slaves’ working 
under less favorable conditions, but they are themselves indifferent to location as 
they constantly shift from one project to the next without remaining bound to 
any center. Urban nomads therefore seem to inhabit a perhaps poorly defined, 
but nevertheless attractive state of constant movement (Boltanski and Chiapello, 
2005). 
This nomadic figure in today’s capitalism has been discussed extensively by the 
‘mobility turn’ within social theory (e.g. Adey, 2009; Büscher et al., 2010; 
Cresswell and Merriman, 2012; Urry, 2007) as well as by organizational studies 
debating work-related mobility (e.g. Costas, 2013; Garsten, 2008; Meerwarth et 
al., 2008; Muhr, 2012). Accordingly, it is now well-known how this nomadic 
figure relates to a number of changed ‘features’ of western working life: life-long 
employment is a rarity, working activities are no longer restricted to one place or 
specific hours, and work is increasingly being organized around short-term 
projects (e.g. Elliott and Urry, 2010; Sennett, 2006). 
In aiming to contribute to the growing literature on work-related mobility, I 
address what remains a hotly debated issue, namely, the moral and normative 
significance of changes pertaining to work- and profession-related mobility. As 
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pointed out by a number of commentators (e.g. Bærenholdt, 2013; Kaplan, 1996; 
Sheller, 2011; Urry, 2000), research on novel forms of mobility tends to split into 
either celebratory accounts of mobility that privilege a nomadic or ‘cosmopolitan 
subjectivity’ (Beck, 2006), or pessimistic accounts that characterize mobility as 
‘merely an ideological veil’ (Pellegrino, 2011: 2) that masks a renewed form of 
economic exploitation and various forms of inequality (Ohnmacht et al., 2009). 
As Ekman (2013: 294) along with Costas (2013) point out, the disagreement 
concerning the ‘moral content’ of mobility is also prevalent within organization 
studies: Has capitalism finally found a way of accommodating freedom of 
movement with efficient ways of organizing, as argued by optimistic strands 
within the management literature (e.g. Arthur and Rousseau, 1996; Kanter, 
2003; Kotter, 2008)? Or are the changes rather, as argued by more critical voices, 
to be interpreted as a primarily economic expansion of profit maximization into 
the private life of employees (Smith, 2006; also cf. Grey, 1994; Thompson and 
Ackroyd, 1995)? 
In answering calls for approaches that broaden existing theoretical repertoires 
and go beyond one-sided conceptions of work-related mobility (Costas, 2013), this 
article explores the theoretical framework developed by Boltanski’s sociology of 
critique (Boltanski, 2012 [1990]; Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]; Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005) and argues that this framework offers a fruitful perspective. 
Its focus on the evolution of capitalism allows one to chart the economic and 
material conditions of mobility critically, while its sociology of morals also allows 
us to see the distinctly normative side of current demands for mobility without 
succumbing to a celebratory idea of a new moral utopia. While the controversial 
overall diagnosis of The new spirit of capitalism (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005) 
has received extensive attention in the literature, there is still, as argued by 
Boxenbaum (2014) and Pernkopf-Konhäusner (2014), something to be gained by 
looking more closely at its underlying theoretical framework, including the order 
of worth model developed in the earlier works of Boltanski and Thévenot (1989, 
1999, 2006 [1991]). In the context of this article, I specifically focus on how this 
underlying framework implies going beyond the dichotomy between economic 
value and moral values in defining mobility while highlighting how the order of 
worth model bears on the investigation of the legitimacy and attractiveness of 
work-related mobility. 
In addition, I will address the attractiveness of mobility by applying the sociology 
of critique perspective to the context of the ‘kinetic elite’ (Costas, 2013; Cresswell, 
2006). Following Cresswell (2006), the ‘kinetic elite’ designates a group of 
highly versatile and often well-paid and mobile project workers employed in 
knowledge-intensive industries, such as diplomacy, banking (Elliot and Urry, 
2010), or consultancy (Costas, 2013). Given the ambivalence of forced forms of 
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mobility prevalent among immigrant workers (Bauman, 1998, 2007) and 
temporary workers (Garsten, 1999) in particular, one should refrain from 
asserting mobility as universally attractive. Nevertheless, Costas (2013: 1476), 
following Augé (1995), has rightly noted that mobility does possess a ‘power of 
attraction’ in the context of creative or knowledge-intensive work. Equally, 
Garsten (2008: 50) points out that mobility has indeed acquired a ‘prestigious 
and glamorous ring’. The question explored here is why this is the case: Why is a 
highly mobile and project-oriented working life attractive in the first place? In 
discussing this question, I add to the mainly theoretically driven re-interpretation 
of work-related mobility by referring to accounts given by three exemplars of the 
‘kinetic elite’: (1) a successful entrepreneur and consultant, (2) an international 
UN diplomat and (3) an international private banker. This allows for an 
exemplary illustration of the mobility experienced by the elite group of highly 
mobile and well-paid workers who belong to what Boltanski and Chiapello (2005) 
call ‘projective capitalism’. My analysis does not reveal an experience of mobility 
as being free of tension and ambiguity. Even in this elite group, the ideal of being 
mobile is often perceived as a problematic imperative, yet nevertheless rewarding 
and worth living up to. The empirical exemplars thus illustrate how the 
attractiveness of a working life ‘on the move’ is articulated in distinctively 
normative terms. 
The article is structured as follows: First, I present the theoretical background to 
the sociology of critique and argue for the necessity of conceptualizing mobility 
beyond an opposition between economic value and moral values. Second, I lay 
out the conceptual architecture of Boltanski and Chiapello’s approach and 
contrast it with other positions in social theory to clarify its distinctive focus and 
ability to analyze mobility. In doing so, I focus on how mobility is implicated in 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis of the emergence of a specific projective form 
of capitalism and ‘projective order of worth’ more generally. Third, I briefly 
introduce the method used in the analysis of the empirical material before 
ending with an analysis and discussion of how mobility functions as a motivating 
and normatively tainted category among the ‘kinetic elite’. 
Conceptualizing mobility beyond the opposition of ‘value’ and ‘values’ 
The key theoretical ambition of Boltanski and Chiapello’s The new spirit of 
capitalism (2005) and of French pragmatic sociology more generally (e.g. 
Boltanski and Thévenot, 1989, 2006 [1991]; Thévenot, 2006; see also Cloutier 
and Langley, 2013; Jagd, 2011; Stark, 2009; Wagner, 1999) is the breaking of the 
so-called Parsonian Pact. According to ‘Parson’s Pact’, moral values are to be 
studied by sociology and philosophy, while economic value is to be studied by 
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economics (cf. Velthuis, 1999 for a historical analysis of the emergence of the 
Parsonian Pact within the social sciences). Rather than accepting such a split, 
Boltanski and Chiapello encourage a short-circuit of the rigid distinction between 
a sociological concept of values and an economic concept of value. Their explicit 
theoretical ambition is therefore to chart the interconnections between the 
normative constitution of society and the productive forces of capitalism. 
Parson’s Pact suggests that we must choose a single vantage point – either value 
or values, either economy or social relations (Stark, 2009). Such a forced choice, 
I suggest, leads to an inept way of looking at the current stress on mobility within 
organizations and beyond. If analyzed as a purely social phenomenon, mobility 
would seem like an idle cog with no real economic causality, and if looked at 
from an exclusively economic viewpoint, mobility would seem like a mere 
advertising trick for an already inexorable economic logic. 
Instead, one must look at work-related mobility as a substantial moral 
phenomenon with real economic, social and organizational effects. Such an 
approach has also been put forward by many of the refined attempts to develop a 
non-reductive account of how moral codes and ethics function within 
organizations, and by attempts to chart how employees and managers constitute 
themselves as specifically moral subjects (e.g. Clegg et al., 2007; Ibarra-Colado et 
al., 2006; Loacker and Muhr, 2009; Muhr et al., 2010; Weiskopf and Willmott, 
2013). This tradition of practice-based approaches to business ethics has covered 
a diverse range of topics (for a brief overview see Wray-Bliss, 2009), and 
although the sociology of critique limits its focus to the orders of worth that 
guide compromise and conflict, these two perspectives concur in two important 
ways. Firstly, they treat the practical base of morality as crucial; and secondly, 
they regard morality as an empirical object to be studied rather than a set of 
abstract, prescriptive standards. Nevertheless, what makes the detour into re-
reading and engaging with Boltanski’s sociology of critique worthwhile is the 
particular connections to the broader arrangements of capitalism and social 
critique that it allows one to make. 
In making such connections, The new spirit of capitalism makes itself vulnerable 
to objections from several sides. Some have advanced the critique that the book is 
too obsessed with the inevitable economic logic of capitalist exploitation 
(basically, it is too Marxist), whereas others have complained that it is too 
idealistic and insufficiently concerned with the dynamics of financial capitalism 
in failing to locate its discussion of ‘spirit’ within political economy; in other 
words, it is not Marxist enough (see Parker, 2013; Willmott, 2013). In breaking 
Parson’s Pact, Boltanski and Chiapello’s aim is, however, to avoid both economic 
reductivism and naïve forms of idealism (Boltanski, 2011b). More specifically, 
they argue that the analysis of the qualitative changes in the modes of organizing 
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during recent decades cannot be described exhaustively in terms of neo-classical 
economy or in classical Marxist terms as a way in which firms increasingly 
exploit what economists would call ‘positive externalities’ (knowledge, creativity, 
innovation, the desires of movement and freedom, etc.). Rather, these changes 
must also be seen as containing a distinctively moral side – a correlative 
modification of the spirit of capitalism – which could justify changes in the first 
place. Likewise, the change in the conception of mobility among organizations 
and the labour force cannot be described merely as an empty ideological effect of 
a much more thorough exploitation of labour. It must also be seen as containing 
a genuine way of evaluating typical social situations and of justifying action.  
However, Willmott (2013: 101-103) is right to point out that it is an impediment 
to the application of Boltanski and Chiapello’s framework that they have not been 
very generous in describing their method vis-à-vis other approaches in social 
theory. Accordingly, I will place the underlying framework of Boltanski and 
Chiapello’s analysis in relation to a series of reasonably well-known theoretical 
positions by addressing the question: What conceptual architecture is required 
for breaking the Parsonian pact and for conceptualizing work-related mobility as 
both a moral and economic phenomenon? I will first address the question of 
what norms and moral values amount to in their account and then proceed to 
describe the interrelations of values with the economic phenomena of today.  
Examining norms: Postmodernism or Habermas? No thanks!  
What theoretical commitments must one take on in order to engage in a serious 
study of the normative frameworks that are active in today’s economy? First of 
all, it is necessary to distance oneself from the naïve ‘brand’ of postmodernism, 
which postulates that the dissolution of the grand narratives of modernity leads 
to a condition where all normative demands cease and where all forms of 
justification are equally valid and therefore essentially all invalid (cf. Callinicos, 
1991). In opposing such views, Boltanski and Chiapello ally with Weber (1968: 
31-33) in maintaining that the foundational question of sociology does not 
concern which norms are theoretically valid or invalid; rather, the foundational 
question concerns which norms are actually in force in contemporary societies. 
The basic problem is not the abstract validity of particular norms, but rather the 
actual efficacy of societal norms. On this level, it can easily be ascertained 
empirically that certain norms operate in contemporary society. When 
considering the prevalence of values such as ‘adaptability’, ‘flexibility’ or the 
importance of ‘staying on the move’ in the present labour market generally, and 
especially among the ‘kinetic elite’ (Costas, 2013; Cresswell, 2006; Elliot and 
Urry, 2010), it is therefore irrelevant whether such values are theoretically valid 
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or whether they belong to an outdated form of modernity, for it is a matter of 
their actual efficacy. 
Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology further opposes the critique of postmodernism 
articulated within Habermasian sociology (cf. Habermas, 1990). The 
Habermasian program of universal pragmatics has also emphasized normativity 
as an essential feature of contemporary society, but it has conceived normative 
prescriptions as clustered around a single, universal and quasi-transcendental 
structure. In contrast, Boltanski has empirically charted a plurality of mutually 
irreducible moral grammars. Boltanski’s earlier work with Laurent Thévenot 
thus aims to identify the different and actually existing moral grammars within 
which actions and actors are evaluated (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]). 
The emphasis on the actual rather than ideal forms of morality is important in 
understanding the aim of the sociology of critique and the sense in which 
mobility might be said to have a moral function within contemporary capitalism. 
The aim is not, as for Habermas and other strands of critical theory, to develop a 
morally informed sociology – an, as it were, moralizing sociology – but rather to 
develop a sociology of morals and critique. In that sense, the sociology of critique 
supplements critical sociology, which bombards practice with its own 
prescriptions, by marking a return to the Weberian ambition of studying actually 
existing forms of social morality. The guiding idea, which has also recently been 
called for in organization studies (Boxenbaum, 2014; Brandl et al., 2014; Cloutier 
and Langley, 2013; Pernkopf-Konhäusner, 2014), is that the actors themselves are 
competent critics. Far from being ‘judgmental dopes’ (to use Garfinkel’s 
expression), actors are instead deemed capable of competently navigating 
different moral grammars in justifying their actions and resolving conflict. 
Within this investigation, morality is connected empirically to a series of orders of 
worth that each contain (1) a specification of value, (2) a definition of worthy 
individuals and (3) a moral grammar for the evaluation of actions.  
Boltanski and Thévenot (2006 [1991]) traced six such competing orders of worth 
in contemporary societies: the inspirational regime, the domestic regime, the 
regime of fame or opinion, the civic regime, the market regime and the industrial 
regime. These regimes all delineate forms of relative agreement that actors 
utilize in identifying social situations and in justifying their position in relation 
to pertinent conflicts or dilemmas. In The new spirit of capitalism, a seventh order 
of worth is added in which mobility is a key element, namely the projective 
regime [fr. la cité par projet]. As Bruno Latour (2005: 23) has noted, the mere 
move from the assumption that agents justify actions within one moral frame to 
the assumption that several such frames may be implicated adds an impressive 
analytical and empirical strength to the sociology of critique. These different 
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regimes have incommensurable moral grammars when compared with each 
other, but what is common to all of these regimes or orders of worth is that they 
serve as forms of justification in the process of finding legitimate solutions to 
social conflicts. In this way, social conflicts spanning from local disputes in a 
nursing home over debates on research strategies to collective wage negations 
can be seen as clashes between different procedures for legitimate justification.  
In the later sections focusing on the ‘kinetic elite’, I will elaborate on the sense in 
which mobility is implicated in moral conflicts and contributes to determining a 
specific sort of worthy individual. Having sketched the analytical status of societal 
values and having pointed to a few places in which such values and forms of 
moral justification impinge on the study of mobility as a distinctively moral 
phenomenon, I will now look at how this connects with the economic diagnosis 
of the present put forward in The new spirit of capitalism.  
Capitalism saturated with values  
Economists and organizational theorists have spoken of the new ‘knowledge 
economy’, ‘experience economy’ or ‘creative economy’, but too often such 
changes in the conditions for value creation have been articulated as if they were 
not particularly connected to capitalism (Kristensen, 2008: 88). There are notable 
exceptions – one could mention the theory of ‘soft’ capitalism (Thrift, 1998) or 
‘informational’ capitalism (Castells, 1996; Hardt and Negri, 2000) – but what is 
distinctive of Boltanski and Chiapello’s work is their sociological engagement 
with organizational phenomena and ideas. 
Rather than rejecting the concept of capitalism as a leftover from the 1970s, 
Boltanski and Chiapello perform a nuanced critique of the Marxist concepts of 
ideology and false consciousness while maintaining the Marxist insight into the 
formal character of capitalism. This formal character is expressed by Boltanski 
and Chiapello’s (2005: 371) concise definition of capitalism: ‘Capitalism [is] a 
process striving for an ever greater accumulation of capital measured by a 
monetary value’. As a pure procedure for the accumulation of monetary value, 
capitalism is not essentially tied to any set of ethical values or even to any specific 
sort of political system. Boltanski and Chiapello are by no means alone in 
maintaining this insight. Deleuze and Guattari have similarly emphasized the 
formal character of capitalism by analyzing it as an ‘axiomatic’ (1987: 436), just 
as Slavoj Žižek (2006: 181) has pointed out that the present globalized capitalism 
is not tied to a particular culture or political system. Today, one can find western 
capitalism, fascist capitalism, arabic capitalism and even, as underlined by a 
recent special issue of ephemera, communist capitalism (Beverungen et al., 2013). 
Accordingly, the originality of Boltanski and Chiapello’s approach does not lie in 
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their formal determination of capitalism, but rather in the consequences that 
they draw from this insight: Capitalism is formally a value-free procedure of 
accumulation, but that is exactly why it is always saturated with norms and 
values. Since capitalism in its formal sense does not contain its own justification 
immanently, it must seek and lend itself normative support from other sources. 
Consequently, it is precisely because of its formal normative neutrality that 
capitalism is always normatively saturated and driven by a particular set of values 
(Presskorn-Thygesen, 2015). 
When it comes to the specific content of such a set of values, capitalism is 
paradoxically sensitive to the forms of critique that it is subjected to. As Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005: 27) write, capitalism ‘needs its enemies, people whom it 
outrages and who are opposed to it, to find the moral supports it lacks and to 
incorporate mechanisms of justice whose relevance it would otherwise have no 
reason to acknowledge’. For Weber (2001 [1905]), the ‘spirit’ of capitalism 
denoted the set of ethical motivations which, although totally foreign to the logic 
of capitalist accumulation itself, could support the calling of making money. 
Critique serves a similar purpose for Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 20), since 
capitalism, faced with the need of justification, latches on to the pre-existing 
normative and critical positions whose legitimacy is already guaranteed. To these 
pre-established normative and critical positions, capitalism ‘only’ adds one 
distinctive twist, namely, the exigency of capital accumulation. It is the historical 
development and integration of such forms of critique, particularly from 1968 
onwards, that is the primary empirical object of study in The new spirit of 
capitalism.  
The focus on the historical development marks a departure from Boltanski’s 
work with Thévenot (2006 [1991]), for while the exact historical genesis of the 
different orders of worth tracked in the earlier work were left somewhat unclear 
(cf. Lepetit, 1995) The new spirit of capitalism can be seen as responding to that 
challenge by charting the genesis of the projective order of worth and insisting 
on its historicity. For several decades, disciplines such as business economics, 
sociology and the psychology of work found it sufficient to denote the historical 
period after 1968 with a number of negatively defined terms such as the ‘post-
industrial’ society or ‘post-Tayloristic’ forms of organizing (Kristensen, 2008). 
Contrary to such a tendency of merely adding the prefix ‘post’, Boltanski and 
Chiapello supply us with a new, positively defined and historically specified 
diagnosis by suggesting that today’s form of capitalist organization is of a 
distinctively projective form. In the following section, I will address the 
characteristics of this new form of projective capitalism and then proceed to 
describe how it emerges as a historical response to criticism, thus adding to 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis by focusing on mobility specifically.  
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Projective capitalism, critique, and the demand for mobility 
What is distinctive about capitalism after 1968 – considered through a purely 
economic lens – is the degree to which knowledge, creativity and networks 
become increasingly important to the economic system (Moulier-Boutang, 2012). 
Even though classical industrial forms of production are perhaps still 
quantitatively dominant on an international scale, the new forms of projective and 
cognitive modes of productions are qualitatively dominant. In other words, the 
new forms of production relate to industry as industry related to agriculture in 
the 19th century: as the qualitatively, if not yet quantitatively, dominant mode of 
production.  
Technically speaking, what occurs in this development is the increasing 
economic exploitation of the whole assemblage of ‘positive externalities’ related 
to human subjectivity. The effective employment of human knowledge, creativity, 
language and experience as productive resources is, of course, dependent upon a 
number of communication, digital and transport technologies that ensure that 
such things cannot only be stored and commodified, but also accessed and 
exchanged with little effort. Mobility within knowledge work is obviously 
contingent upon such technologies. It is, as explored by Böhm et al. (2006), 
contingent upon planes and high-speed trains as potential places of work, and 
perhaps even more decisively on the portable digital technologies that allow 
individuals to work and stay in touch with project partners (Dyer-Witheford et al., 
2010). The thesis in The new spirit of capitalism is, however, that economic and 
technical developments are also correlative to and partly conditioned by changes 
in the normative values of society.  
The recent change in the spirit of capitalism, as diagnosed by Boltanski and 
Chiapello, is the emergence of a new order of worth related to project-oriented 
forms of organizing. In empirically ‘tracking’ this regime, Boltanski and 
Chiapello focus on novel forms of government, management and leadership and 
accordingly combine historical analysis with a massive study and textual analysis 
of management literature published in-between 1960 and 1999.1 The emergence !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Two main methodological objections to this empirical method have been raised by 
organizational scholars (Willmott, 2013): Firstly, Boltanski and Chiapello’s source 
material is primarily of French origin: Only 18 of the 126 books analyzed are English 
and none are of non-Western origin. Secondly, their empirical study omits whole 
traditions of critical organizational research. They do not analyze works from the 
influential labour process theory inspired by Braverman (1998 [1974]), just as they 
fail to touch upon the classics of the CMS movement (e.g. Alvesson and Willmott, 
1992). While of a generic kind, the first criticism hits the mark: Although the 
managerial and ideological scene of France is obviously not insular and relevantly 
similar to those of many other western countries, hasty and non-careful 
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of this new projective order of worth can gradually be traced until it seemingly 
becomes dominant in the 1990s, where it is increasingly clear that management 
theory and practice are orienting themselves towards a new set of values. In 
1992, Peter F. Drucker, who had been hailed as a management guru since the 
1946 publication of The Concept of the Corporation, wrote that management had 
experienced a ‘big bang’. Following Drucker’s (1992) characterization of this ‘big 
bang’ as consisting in the organization being turned ‘upside down’, Boltanski 
and Chiapello (2005: 71) describe the profound change as ‘a subversion of 
hierarchies’. The new set of values is governed by a ‘connextionist logic’ that 
prescribes a flat, flexible and network-based organization and a group of project-
minded employees who constantly form new relations and constellations. 
Hierarchal forms of organization are left behind as ‘bureaucratic’, whereas 
organizations characterized by fluid networks are deemed faster and more 
innovative. These changes are normatively justified with reference to an anti-
authoritarian demand for more worker influence and values such as autonomy, 
flexibility and creativity (ibid.: 326; see also Ekman, 2013; Fleming, 2009; 
Murtola and Fleming, 2011).  
The (in)famous biting irony of Boltanski and Chiapello’s diagnosis occurs when 
one considers the origin of these values: They can partially be tracked back to the 
ideals of May 1968. These ideals were articulated precisely as the striving for 
increased autonomy, self-realization and creativity. Accordingly, the protester of 
May ‘68 nowadays appears like the perfect model of an employee in a modern 
consultancy firm. Beyond such crude irony, however, May ‘68 is only important 
as an event that epitomizes the peak of a brief and fleeting convergence of two 
much broader and historically diverse strands of criticism directed against 
capitalism, namely, the social critique and the artistic critique (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005: 169-202; Chiapello, 2013).  
The artistic critique in its modern form begins to exert a strong influence on 
society and capitalism from the beginning of the 19th century when the artist was 
no longer a mere artisan, but also a cultural figure. The artistic critique often 
formulated itself exactly in terms of an opposition between mobility and stability. 
The artist, whose paradigmatic example could be Baudelaire, is a ‘nomadic’ free 
thinker who remains detached from all earthly possessions and as such stands 
opposed to ‘the bourgeoisie’, an entity rooted in property while remaining !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
generalizations should always be avoided. The second objection has a partial rebuttal 
at least, since Boltanski and Chiapello’s methodological selection criteria deliberately 
ignore critical studies of management (see Boltanski and Chiapello 2005: 60-63). 
The authors argue that the Zeitgeist of management is most aptly captured in its 
proponents, and they are thus only interested in texts that are ‘practical’ and 
‘directive’ in terms of how to conduct business. 
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devoted to the trivialities of everyday routine (Boltanski and Chiapello, 2005: 38). 
The social critique has an alternative source of indignation that stems from early 
French socialism and assumes its paradigmatic form in the writings of Marx. In 
promoting social concerns, it attacks egoism, the dominance of special interests 
and the divide between the active poor and the idle rich. In criticizing capitalism, 
it denounces poverty, inequality and hierarchy and promotes equality and 
dynamic forms of social organization.  
Going beyond Boltanski and Chiapello’s own analysis, I would add that it is 
worth noting that mobility also played a key historical role in the social forms of 
critique. As Koselleck (2002) notes, the demand for geographical mobility was a 
headline in the campaign for the abolition of feudalist compulsory labor during 
the French Revolution and more generally in Europe at the end of 18th century. 
After the abolition of serfdom, farmers and working men were to a greater 
degree free to leave the estates that employed them; but this change was initially 
a legal rather than real socio-economic change (ibid.: 158). A few decades later, 
when the critical agenda had moved on to social and economic conditions, 
mobility, now in the guise of social and class mobility, emerged as a key term. 
Indeed, as Koselleck notes in his Begriffsgeschichten (2006: 433), the emergence of 
the very concept of a ‘middle class’ in the 1830s was closely tied to that of social 
mobility. The important concept of middle class, which could assert its rights 
towards the state and private companies, only emerged on the background of an 
idea of social mobility and at the very moment when social mobility seemed like 
a real possibility. 
Despite the indicated common emphasis on mobility, the artistic critique and the 
social critique were often mutually conflicting. Social critique frequently deplored 
the egoism of artists while the artistic critique often accused socialism of 
censuring creativity. Nevertheless, they share the common fate of having 
provided some of the terms that lend legitimacy to projective capitalism. 
Boltanski and Chiapello, for instance, meticulously analyze how the anti-state 
rhetoric of the 1970s changed its critical direction and was absorbed into 
capitalism. Taking the denouncement of the compromise between state and 
capitalism (‘state monopoly capitalism’) as its point of departure, social critique 
in the 1970s criticized the state as ‘a monopoly of violence’ and as an ‘ideological 
bureaucracy’. This libertarian rhetoric resembled that of liberalism to the point 
that such criticisms became neo-liberal ‘without knowing it’ (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005: 202). The gradual emergence of a projective form of capitalism 
is, in other words, simultaneously the story of how the very terms of criticism 
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that were initially directed against capitalism grew into a normative foundation 
supporting capitalism.2  
In abstract but concise terms, Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005: 53) model of 
critique aims at examining how capitalism ensures the motivated participation of 
the labour force, given that capitalism always tends towards making such 
participation impossible. Indeed, the key concept of a ‘spirit’ of capitalism is 
rooted in this contradiction in the sense that the spirit of capitalism aims at 
mobilizing the labour force by providing an ethical or normative motivation for 
working that capitalism cannot fully establish by itself. What was once a critique 
of capitalism now takes the guise of an ‘ethic of work’ that is genuinely 
motivating for the actors within capitalism. In the empirical section, I look at 
how this new order of worth plays out in relation to mobility in more concrete 
and empirical terms: Why is the nomadic life of more or less constant mobility 
worthwhile? What morality is detectable in this trait pertaining to at least the elite 
group of contemporary knowledge workers? What sense of ‘worth’ and 
‘greatness’ can be detected in this form of work?  
Methodology 
In order to address the questions outlined above, the paper refers to empirical 
material stemming from semi-structured interviews. The interviews were 
conducted to explore understandings, justifications and ideas concerning 
mobility and to exemplify how mobility is depicted within the projective order of 
worth. Semi-structured interviews, in contrast to rigid ‘talking questionaries’ 
(Alvesson, 2003; Potter and Wetherell, 1987), allow for an open exploration and 
documentation of the respondents’ experience, knowledge and ideas related to a 
research topic. As such, semi-structured interviews are a particularly useful tool 
in reflexively exploring theoretical constructs (Alvesson, 2003). In accordance 
with the methodological perspective set forth by the sociology of critique, the 
conducted interviews specifically aimed at exploring the moral evaluations and 
justifications of mobility in the context of the ‘kinetic elite’ (Cresswell, 2006). 
Methodologically, the empirical analysis thus wishes to make explicit how 
exemplars of an elite group of workers frame and understand mobility. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 In explaining how such criticisms are integrated into capitalism, it is enlightening, as 
pointed out by Larsen (2011), to supplement Boltanski and Chiapello’s argument with 
Foucault’s idea of discourses as being ‘tactically polyvalent’ (Foucault, 1976: 132). For 
Foucault, the tactical polyvalence of discourses indicates that the direction of critical 
discourses is not always uniform and that critical terms are often applied contextually 
and tactically instead. Boltanski and Chiapello’s analysis of the social and artistic 
critique is precisely concerned with such changes and reversals in the direction of 
critical discourses. 
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More specifically, I draw on three exemplars of the ‘kinetic elite’: (1) Peter, a 
Danish entrepreneur and business consultant presently involved in five 
geographically dispersed start-up companies in Denmark within sectors 
spanning from consultancy to agriculture; (2) Mary, a Danish UN diplomat, who 
has lived on four continents during the last four years taking up different 
diplomatic positions in New York, Kabul, Copenhagen and Addis Ababa; and (3) 
Eisner, an English and highly successful private banker working on several 
projects and dividing his time between London and New York. Among the 
respondents, a dual sense of ‘mobility’ is exemplified in that they undertake 
shifting projects in geographically dispersed settings, thus making frequent travel 
and movement a necessity (Cresswell, 2006). The analysis of Peter and Mary is 
based on qualitative semi-structured interviews I have conducted. The interviews 
focused upon experiences of mobility, work schedules, family issues, network 
activities, and roles and shifts within projects. The interviews were recorded, fully 
transcribed and followed up with clarificatory correspondence. The analysis of 
Eisner’s case, however, is based on a re-interpretation of interviews and 
qualitative data presented in Elliott and Urry (2010). The case is used because of 
its highly illustrative qualities as to the ‘lure of mobility’ (Costas, 2013). 
While caution is, of course, needed in using empirical material stemming from 
another study, e.g. because the full context of the data is unknown and the full 
transcripts cannot be checked etc., this approach also indicates the role of the 
empirical cases in the present article: They serve as no more, but also no less, 
than illustrative exemplars aiming to show how the present injunction to be 
mobile works in the context of the ‘kinetic elite’ (for a methodological discussion 
of illustrative cases see e.g. Flyvbjerg, 2006). The aim is not to establish 
generalizations about the perception of mobility among elite workers or other 
occupational groups like, for example, temporary workers (Garsten, 1999). 
Rather and similar to Garmann Johnsen and Meier Sørensen’s (2014) analysis of 
elite consultants, I utilize the empirical exemplars to illustrate and explore the 
possibilities and explanatory power of a broader theoretical frame, namely, 
Boltanski’s sociology of critique. 
During the process of conducting and analyzing the interviews, I have focused on 
the ambiguities of work-related mobility and on the question of why a mobile life 
might seem attractive to the interviewees. The perspective from the sociology of 
critique makes this question pertinent since it highlights that the question 
cannot be answered easily by adopting what Ricoeur (1991) and Rancière (2004) 
have diagnosed as a problematic and suspicious paternalism towards the actors, 
namely that of assuming that they must suffer from some form of ‘false 
consciousness’ (Boltanski, 2012; Paulsen Hansen, 2014). On a methodological 
level, the sociology of critique implies that the actors’ moral judgments of 
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attractiveness, greatness and justice cannot be dismissed as simple ideological 
distortions. Instead, one should devote serious attention to the type of moral 
vocabulary that they use in justifying their mobile way of working. In the 
empirical analysis, I thus pay special attention to the way in which Mary, Peter 
and Eisner articulate a reflexive awareness of conflicting demands of their 
working lives and how they justify being constantly on the move. In the 
subsequent discussion, I link the empirical insights to broader theoretical 
concerns. Specifically, I will apply the concept of a projective order of worth to 
discuss the morality inherent to the imperative of being mobile. 
Empirical analysis 
The empirical cases Mary, Peter and Eisner, belong to different professions 
concomitant with different degrees of mobility. While Peter, an entrepreneur and 
business consultant, is usually ‘on the road’, Mary’s work as an international 
diplomat takes her from continent to continent. What ties them together, 
however, is not only the trait typical for the elite class to which they belong – 
namely, the absence of a fixed workplace and their work on several projects – but 
also a reflexive articulation of their mobility as containing both drawbacks and an 
attractive side. As previously indicated, the empirical analysis of the cases of 
Mary, Peter and Eisner focuses on this ambiguous experience of mobility and on 
the question of why a constantly mobile life might seem attractive. 
Peter, for instance, articulates a clear sense of the possible drawbacks and 
conflicting demands of his mobile life. Currently in his early 40s, Peter is hired 
as a business consultant at a branch of a prominent Scandinavian investment 
firm, but he also simultaneously devotes himself to new startup companies and 
business projects in various parts of Denmark. With reference to his family and 
his engagement in multiple geographically dispersed projects and business 
ventures, Peter articulates the following potential drawback: 
My greatest challenge is to define when I am working and when I am not working. 
It is a challenge, since I can work on the train, here [at the investment firm], at the 
countryside or at home. 
Peter is well aware of the challenges pertaining to the stressfulness of his work 
and the possible lines of critique that can be raised against his way of working. 
Nevertheless, Peter seems to incorporate this critique into an explanation of why 
his way of working is attractive and even worth demanding:  
You need to be mobile and flexible in order to adapt to the growing amount of 
changes that characterize business life, but some people can’t handle it. Some 
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people don’t have flexible muscles, and so their muscles cramp. But I can handle 
it. And I wouldn’t live without it. I consciously look for variation. 
Asked about the relative job insecurity of a working life consisting of multiple 
projects, Peter acknowledges a certain degree of insecurity, but reverses the 
potential line of critique by stating that he has always regarded his wife’s steady 
source of income as a nurse as ‘much more insecure’, since while she could be 
laid off at any moment, he will always have several projects and partners to rely 
on. 
In a similar manner, Mary, an international diplomat in her mid-30s who is 
married but without children, acknowledges the ambivalences involved in 
moving from continent to continent for diplomatic posts at foreign embassies. 
She admits that other people have often found her nomadic life somewhat 
bizarre; nonetheless, she states that:  
What above all characterizes this sort of mobile life is that the border for what is 
‘normal’ is moved. The sort of border for what you just do without finding it weird. 
When I tell of my plans, other people often say: ‘Alright, that sounds nuts’ 
[laughs]. But I’ll just do it. I’ll just throw myself into it. Conversely, other people 
often have a routinized everyday life of exactly the sort that I try to avoid.  
Mary, furthermore, articulates mobility as a necessity in acquiring ‘the right 
partners’ and justifies the often stressful absence of an ordinary 9 to 5 working 
day with reference to a mutually beneficial connection between mobility and 
networking:  
It’s just more attractive to be abroad. You get a larger network and I live off having 
a large network. It [work in diplomacy] is a system in which access to people and 
information is essential. And that’s also why it is impossible to have a 9 to 5 
working day. If there is a late night reception in New York with some interesting 
people, you show up. You have to be able to work at all times, because other people 
also work at all times. On the other hand, this is also the interesting thing about 
meeting new people. Everyone’s performance is optimized by having good 
partners.  
Like Peter, however, she also emphasizes the pressure concomitant with work-
related mobility. In particular, she mentions living without the comforts of 
‘routine’ and the safety remaining ‘bound to one place’. Mary describes the 
characteristics of someone not fit for her job in the following way:  
A person who likes routine and to stay in one place does not fit in. A person, who 
likes to work one case at a time. Someone who likes to have fixed goals. Persons 
who prefer to co-operate with a fixed set of people. That would be my personal 
impression of someone who would not be able to make it.  
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In the case of Peter and Mary, mobility is articulated as an often problematic 
imperative, but as one which is nevertheless rewarding and worth living up to. 
The ability to meet this imperative is articulated as ‘marking’ them as a particular 
sort of individual, and in both cases the justification in response to critique is 
that mobility provides flexibility and allows avoiding routine. While Peter 
acknowledges certain challenges of simultaneous involvements in geographically 
dispersed firms resulting in the fact that ‘there is no such thing as a typical 
working week’, he still claims to ‘thrive on complexity and chaos’. Mary goes on 
to praise mobility – in the dual sense of shifting tasks and frequent travels – in 
similar terms:  
It [mobility] gives you the feeling of having challenged yourself. Of constantly 
gaining new insight. Of having widened your horizon. It is incredibly inspiring. 
Perhaps it is the experience of freedom. I don’t know. But it frees you from 
routines and provides new opportunities.  
Such a portrayal of mobility is consistent with how mobility is presented in Elliot 
and Urry’s (2010) work. One of their main empirical cases, Eisner, is a successful 
English banker and consultant in his 40s with teenage children. He has a wide-
ranging background and holds multiple positions. Currently he is hired for a 
project in the London branch of an investment bank. His presence at the bank’s 
New York branch is, however, also required several times a month, and he also 
travels to do consultancy work for clients he acquired in his previous jobs (ibid.: 
70-71). Eisner sketches a normal day in the following way:  
Usually, I am up at around five in morning and at the office by six thirty. I meet 
with clients throughout the day, which more often than not involves email and 
phone calls – unless I am meeting a client for lunch. I go home at about seven, 
have dinner and try to find some time to talk on the phone with my teenage 
daughter – who is at a boarding school. Then it’s back to paperwork and late night 
conference calls. (Elliott and Urry, 2010: 71) 
As noted by Elliot and Urry, it seems that Eisner hardly experiences the physical 
mobility of bankers’ intercontinental travels and everyday working practices as 
burdensome. A lack of immediately noticing and/or experiencing travel is also 
reflected in an account given by Mary. Yet she acknowledges that travelling can 
also lead to a sense of ambivalence and confusion:  
Very seldom, I get these moments of confusion where I can’t really remember 
what country I’m in, what the currency is and so forth. But normally, travelling is 
hardly experienced as anything extraordinary. It has to be more and more extreme 
for you to register it as ‘something’.  
When Georg Simmel (1976 [1903]) wrote on the new hectic metropolitan life a 
century ago, travels by train or car were still experienced in ‘isolation’ as unique 
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events, while travelling by plane hardly stands out for Mary or Eisner (Elliott and 
Urry, 2010: 60). Eisner articulates mobility with reference to ‘short-term 
projects, business on the move’ and adds that he, like Mary and Peter, flourishes 
on ‘complexity’ (ibid.: 70). As Eisner points out, his main talent is making shifts 
among places and projects seem easy. Whether acting as an expert on real estate, 
a networker or as an invest banker, his talent is ‘to make any contradictions 
between these roles appear untroubling’ (ibid.: 73). Urry and Elliot note that there 
is an ‘attractive, indeed seductive’ quality to Eisner’s way of working and Eisner 
himself confides that his lifestyle is the envy of friends and acquaintances. But, 
what makes such a way of working attractive and what, apart from the obvious 
economic benefits, would make such a mobile and fast-paced life ‘high status’ 
and worthy of both envy and desire? Mary appreciates the economic benefits of 
‘moving around’, but simultaneously emphasizes the necessity of ‘liking 
mobility’ and finding it attractive in its own right: 
It used to be economically attractive to be placed abroad as a diplomat. But it is not 
that advantageous any more. Now you have to do it [being mobile] because you like 
it. But, it will tend to further your career.  
In the following discussion, I will apply the notion of the order of worth to the 
evaluations of work-related mobility evoked in the three exemplars of the ‘kinetic 
elite’. This allows me to explore and discuss why and in what sense mobility 
currently appears as an attractive sign of worthiness. 
Discussion 
Ibarro et al. (2006: 52) have argued that ethics and morality in organizations 
cannot adequately be conceptualized as something that is controlled by 
management. It must also be seen as taking the form of a demand posed to 
management. Following this general suggestion, it could be contended that a key 
to understanding mobility as incarnating a form of morality in high-end working 
lives would be to appreciate how mobility is not just a demand imposed on 
employees from management, but equally a demand posed by the employees. As 
pointed out by Costas et al. (2013: 16), the presence of such a demand can easily 
be missed in analyses of the many pitfalls of projective forms of organizing 
referring, for instance, to the issue of relative job insecurity (Hassard et al., 
2012), the difficulties of maintaining a proper work-life balance (Raastrup 
Kristensen, 2010), or the emotional stress of being constantly on the move 
(Pedersen, 2008). Despite all these ‘real’ material problems, mobility and the 
constant engagement with multiple networks seem to be experienced as an 
attractive state (Costas, 2013; Garsten, 2008: 50). 
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In relating work-related mobility to economic benefits, Mary’s above-quoted 
account seems to indicate precisely that mobility is both an attractive end in itself 
(‘you do it because you like it’) and a means to an end (‘it will tend to further your 
career’). This duality corresponds to a point from Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology 
that bridges the divide between economic value and moral values: Even forms of 
economic organization must, in order to be motivating and attractive, be able to 
engage its actors by convincing them that they contribute, at least potentially, to a 
common good (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]). This is the basic role 
fulfilled by the work ethic associated with the projective order of worth (Boltanski 
and Chiapello, 2005).  
As indicated earlier, an order of worth contains a specification of value, a 
determination of worthy individuals and a moral grammar for the evaluation of 
actions. Phrased more formally, the order of worth model requires a basic equality 
among the actors, which does not exclude differences, but rather enables a 
meritocratic scale of justified differences among the actors. Specific persons 
cannot, a priori, be deemed worthy, but as a result of their activity worthy and 
unworthy persons can be distinguished from each other by means of various 
tests. Everyone can gain access to worthiness, in principle, but certain investments 
are required. Since such investments and efforts seemingly work towards a 
common good, it is not considered unjust for some people to have greater worth 
[grandeur] than others (Albertsen, 2008; Boltanski and Thévenot, 1991).  
Mary, Peter and Eisner’s mobility practices are conditioned by their involvement 
in multiple, geographically dispersed projects – and within the projective order of 
worth, the basic form of activity that differentiates worthy or great persons from 
those of lesser worth and greatness is precisely that of project work. Unlike other 
schemes of evaluation, such as those analyzed under the heading of the 
industrial order of worth (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 [1991]: 118-124), this 
form of activity goes beyond stable waged work. The notion of a project blurs the 
dichotomies of stable/unstable activity, waged/non-waged work and, as pointed 
out in a study by Beyes and Krempl (2011), in some cases, it even transcends the 
opposition of work versus non-work. One could, however, argue that there are 
also traces of the inspirational order of worth (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006 
[1991]: 83-90) in the accounts given by the three respondents. Most clearly 
exhibited in theological ideas of revelation, the inspirational order of worth is a 
moral frame of reference that places emphasis on ‘imaginative’ individuals who 
have received a kind of ‘spiritual’ revelation, and as such it evaluates worthiness 
and attractiveness in terms of achieving inspiration and insight. In Mary’s 
account of mobility as being ‘incredibly inspiring’ and engendering an 
experience of ‘gaining new insight’ one can e.g. see elements of such a 
vocabulary in play. Nevertheless, and in contrast to the inspirational order of 
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worth, what is practiced and articulated in the case of Mary, Peter and Eisner is 
not a moral set of values aimed at a life of spiritual contemplation. On the 
contrary, and as exemplified by Peter’s diverse portfolio of projects, activity and 
variation are encouraged regardless of whether it concerns waged work, unstable 
consultancy work, involvement in politics or charitable work. As Boltanski and 
Chiapello (2005: 111) note, the moral grammar of a ‘project’ is broad: opening a 
business and closing a business are equally projects. They can all be undertaken 
with the same sense of heroism. 
Within the projective order of worth, this secures a basic equality among actors. If 
a project can be almost anything, almost everyone can engage in a project. It is, 
however, crucial never to stick to just one project: One must always be adaptable, 
versatile, mobile and engaged on multiple fronts. As pointed out by, for instance, 
Chertkovskaya et al. (2013), constantly shifting projects in today’s knowledge 
work is not exclusively experienced as risk taking, but also as a way of increasing 
one’s employability. This point is also seized by Peter who states that he regards 
his wife’s position as a nurse as ‘much more insecure’ than his – while she could 
be laid off, he will always have several overlapping projects to rely on.  
Being mobile in the sense of successfully making the passage from one project to 
the next is of vital importance in evaluating claims of worth within the projective 
order of worth. If one conceives of social organization as if it were the scene of a 
trial where competent actors can legitimately make claims and challenge each 
other (Boltanski, 2013: 46), then the insecure passage from one project to the 
next functions as a test of the actors’ pretensions to greatness (cf. Boltanski, 
2002: 384; de Cock and Nyberg, forthcoming). You may be able to ‘talk the talk’ 
of being mobile, but the test of worthiness is if you manage to successfully pass 
from one project to another and thus be actually and continually engaged in 
several projects. When trying to explicate the morality and sense of justice 
inherent to the projective order of worth, it is important to note that a multiplicity 
of engagements cannot only serve as a personal ‘asset’ that potentially increases 
employability (having a broad and flexible portfolio of activities means never 
having to start from scratch), but also as something that works, at least with 
some plausibility, towards the common good. Being engaged in multiple projects 
means that the benefits of one’s activities are spread out: one shares information, 
spreads the generation of profit, inspires others and exemplifies, by these means, 
the importance of investing in networking activities. Worthy individuals are 
distinguished from less worthy by their investments, that is, by ‘sacrifices’ that 
are made with the aim of contributing to common benefit (Thévenot, 1984). 
Sacrificing, for instance, the predictable safety of a 9 to 5 working day is then 
again part of what justifies the relative benefits of being mobile. To apply the 
language of investment, the privileges of worthy individuals are ‘counter-
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balanced’ by their burdens (cf. Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 142). As also 
indicated by Boltanski and Chiapello (2005: 115-9), the benefits are not 
exclusively conceived of as personal; a large network is a personal asset in terms 
of receiving relevant information, but also an outlet for one’s activities to work 
towards a common good. As Mary emphasized in her explanation of the apparent 
necessity of attending late night receptions in New York, ‘everyone’s 
performance is optimized by having good partners’, and since ‘access to people 
and information is essential’ that is ‘also why it is impossible to have a 9 to 5 
working day.’ 
As suggested by Boltanski’s pragmatic sociology, the connection to a common 
good is the key to the meritocratic and thus justified greatness of professionals 
like Eisner, Mary and Peter. At the lower end of the meritocratic scale in the 
projective order of worth, we find people who are immobile in the sense of being 
rooted in routine and sometimes bound to one place. As Mary states, a person 
who ‘likes routine and to stay in one place does not fit in’. This is also 
emphasized by Peter who argues that a person with a preference for routine 
would not be able ‘to make it’. Here the ability to handle the pressure of being 
mobile seems to be articulated as a moral accomplishment that differentiates 
oneself from those who are ‘not able to make it’; or, to put it in Peter’s words, 
those ‘without flexible muscles’. 
Conversely and at the very top of the meritocratic scale, we find professionals like 
Eisner, who claim the ability to easily make transitions between places and 
contexts to be their main talent. If the description of Eisner can be taken at face 
value, then his qualities seem like a mirror of the ‘nomadic theology’ inherent to 
today’s conception of mobility. Put differently, Eisner appears as an almost exact 
incarnation of the ‘ideal man’ of the projective order of worth: 
His [the ideal man’s] principal quality is his mobility, his ability to move around 
without letting himself be impeded by boundaries, whether geographical or 
derived from professional or cultural affiliations, by hierarchical distances, by 
differences of status, role, origin, group, and to establish personal contact with 
other actors, who are often far removed socially or spatially. (Boltanski and 
Chiapello, 2005: 79) 
As indicated by the framework behind the sociology of critique, the use of a 
meritocratic scale is, however, not merely to indicate an attractive position – it 
can just as easily be an instrument of critique. If certain organizational or societal 
structures prevent the mobility and flexibility of individuals, they thereby hinder 
possible ascendancy to greatness, and legitimate claims against such structures 
can be made. That is to say, the projective order of worth does not only serve to 
justify the greatness of certain individuals; it also motivates and serves as the 
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foundation of a demand for an increased mobility. While Mary and Peter do not 
convey the impression of a frictionless ‘cosmopolitan life’ (Beck, 2006) they, 
however, articulate a commitment and even a demand for the kind of flexibility 
that their work-related mobility implies and reflects. As a final remark, one could 
therefore utilize Koselleck’s (1995) vocabulary to say that the concept of mobility 
seems itself to have become a ‘concept of movement’ [Bewegungsbegriffe]; that is, a 
concept which offers an attractive promise to actors, thus moving and motivating 
them in certain ways despite their awareness that this promise might continually 
fail its unproblematic fulfillment.3 In summary, the projective order of worth and 
its explication of this promise add to the clarification of how mobility functions 
as a motivating and normatively tainted category in today’s world of organizing. 
In this way, it indicates an explanation of the in itself remarkable fact that the 
word ‘mobilization’ has become another word for ‘motivation’ within currently 
prevalent discourses of management and work. 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have aimed to show that the theoretical framework of Boltanski’s 
sociology of critique offers a fruitful perspective on work-related mobility and 
provides a conceptualization of mobility that allows us to indicate and analyze 
some of the much called for connections between mobility as a moral and a 
socio-economic phenomenon (Cresswell, 2006; Sheller, 2011). As many 
commentators have noticed (e.g. Bærenholdt, 2013; Sheller, 2011; Urry, 2007), 
the literature on mobility has often tended towards being caught in a false 
alternative between celebratory accounts that characterize new forms of mobility 
as enabling an unprecedented form of ‘nomadic freedom’, and pessimistic 
evaluations that characterize new forms of mobility as embodying a renewed 
form of exploitation. As I have argued in the theoretical exposition of Boltanski’s 
work with Thévenot (2006 [1991]) as well as Chiapello (2005), the sociology of 
critique and its breaking of ‘Parson’s Pact’ offer a perspective that goes beyond 
such ‘false alternatives’. On the one hand, it offers an analytical frame that allows 
us to historicize the conditions of mobility and to investigate its material and 
economic prerequisites, while on the other hand it offers an empirically sensitive 
framework that does not lose sight of the sense in which the ideal of mobility 
inherent to projective forms of work has genuine appeal to the actors engaged in 
it. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 For Koselleck (1995), such promissory content is constitutive of the linguistic items 
belonging to the modern political and moral vocabulary and thus of concepts like 
‘equality’ or ‘freedom’. These are concepts [Begriffe] which motivate and move actors 
[Bewegungsbegriffe] by being promises or pre-conceptions [Vorgriffe] of a desirable 
future, which may yet fail to realize itself and, therefore, has to be demanded. 
Thomas Presskorn-Thygesen The ambiguous attractiveness of mobility 
article  | 747 
The necessity of going beyond ‘false alternatives’ in the analysis of mobility is, 
furthermore, stressed by the article’s empirical illustrations of how the moral 
imperative of mobility works in the specific context of the ‘kinetic elite’. As noted 
by Costas (2013), many studies of this elite group of workers have tended towards 
a depiction of the group as living frictionless cosmopolitan lives. In short, they 
have been constructed as ‘postmodern surfers’, to use Grey’s (2002) popular 
metaphor. In contrast to such a one-sided depiction, the empirical cases analyzed 
in this article suggest a more nuanced picture in which work-related mobility 
emerges as a challenging and sometimes problematic imperative. Nevertheless, 
the empirical exemplars also present mobility as a rewarding imperative that is 
worth living up to. In aiming to explain this appeal of mobility, I have utilized 
Boltanski and Chiapello’s (2005) notion of a projective order of worth to show 
how the mobile lives of professionals like Mary, Peter and Eisner can be related 
to the norms, ideals and the sense of worth inherent to this order. 
In spite of emphasizing a moral aspect integrative to the forms of mobility found 
in the ‘kinetic elite’, it is important to note that the perspective suggested here 
does not entail an appraisal of  mobility. To use Boltanski’s own example, the 
analysis of the flexible normative foundations of capitalism ought to cure us, 
once and for all, from the view that the young trendy designer, who divides her 
time between the art galleries of Berlin, London and New York, is a sort of quasi-
subversive hero undermining capitalism (Boltanski, 2004). On the contrary, and 
as already suggested by the fable of mobility from the Book of Exodus stated at the 
beginning of this article, the mobility of the ‘kinetic elite’ is often problematically 
conditioned by the immobility or forced mobility of others (Bauman, 1998, 
2007). 
In summary, this article has used the perspective of the sociology of critique and 
applied the order of worth model to argue that taking account of the moral appeal 
of mobility and its promises of greatness is a condition for posing the important 
question of the attractiveness of being mobile in the context of today’s ‘kinetic 
elite’. In several respects, this elite group – among others composed of mobile 
consultants, bankers and diplomats – seems emblematic of the qualitative 
transformations that characterize the knowledge-intensive sectors of the present 
economy. Rather than a mere idle cog or a symptom of some form of false 
consciousness, the moral injunction to be mobile, flexible and constantly on the 
move must be seen as a key driver of the qualitative transformations that 
characterize these sectors and contemporary capitalism more generally. 
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